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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A201-785-542) 
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Golparvar 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 15, 2021 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.  
 











* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
Lazaro Mendez-Ambrosio, a native of Guatemala, entered the United States 
without inspection in March 2019.  He was detained upon his arrival, and he sought 
asylum as well as withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
based on a fear of violence by members of a gang who murdered his brother in 2010.  See 
generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (providing for asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3) (providing for 
withholding of removal).  For similar reasons, he also sought protection under the 
Convention Against Torture.  See generally 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (providing for CAT 
withholding); id. § 208.17 (providing for CAT deferral).  After an unsuccessful hearing 
before an Immigration Judge, Mendez-Ambrosio appealed to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, which issued a final order denying him all relief.  Mendez-Ambrosio then 
timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s final order, bringing this matter within the 
jurisdiction of this Court.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).   
The problem with Mendez-Ambrosio’s asylum and INA withholding claims is that 
the Immigration Judge determined that he was not credible.  Mendez-Ambrosio delivered 
inconsistent accounts of the night of his brother’s death, the timing and circumstances of 
the deaths of his two brothers-in-law, and the extent of his interaction with Guatemalan 
police.  On administrative appeal, the BIA affirmed, explaining that “[a] persecution 
claim that lacks veracity cannot satisfy the burdens of proof and persuasion necessary to 
establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal.”  BIA Decision at 2 (AR 4).  
In reviewing those determinations under the substantial-evidence standard, an 
Immigration Judge’s credibility determinations receive “exceptional deference.”  
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Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2017).  And nothing about Mendez-
Ambrosio’s proffered explanations for his inconsistent statements compels a conclusion 
that the Immigration Judge erred in assessing Mendez-Ambrosio’s credibility.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).   
Mendez-Ambrosio’s claim for CAT relief fares no better.  Both the Immigration 
Judge and the BIA concluded that Mendez-Ambrosio did not demonstrate that it was 
more likely than not that he would be tortured in Guatemala with acquiescence of 
Guatemalan authorities.  See generally Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515–17 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  The administrative record details how Guatemalan authorities successfully 
prosecuted the murder of his brother: they arrested, charged, and tried those responsible 
for that killing.  Without record evidence compelling a contrary conclusion, the BIA’s 
order satisfies the substantial-evidence standard in this respect as well.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).   
Accordingly, we will deny the petition.   
